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Minimum Wage and Tax Evasion: Theory and Evidence
* 
 
This paper examines the interaction between minimum wage legislation and tax evasion by 
employed labor. I develop a model in which firms and workers may agree to report less than 
the true amount of earnings to the fiscal authorities. I show that introducing a minimum wage 
creates a spike in the distribution of declared earnings and induces higher compliance by 
some agents, thus reducing their disposable income. The comparison of food consumption 
and of the consumption-income gap before and after the massive minimum wage hike that 
took place in Hungary in 2001 reveals that households who appeared to benefit from the hike 
actually experienced a drop compared to similar but unaffected households, thus supporting 





I model the interaction between minimum wage and tax evasion by employed labor. 
Introducing a minimum wage creates a spike in the distribution of declared earnings. A 
minimum wage induces higher compliance by some and reduces their disposable income. I 
use the minimum wage hike that took place in Hungary in 2001 as a quasi experiment. The 
analysis of food consumption and the consumption-income gap supports the theory. 
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I. Introduction
What are the ￿scal implications of introducing or increasing the minimum wage? What
is its impact on disposable income? This paper contributes to answering these questions by
examining the interaction between minimum wage legislation and tax evasion by employed
labor.
I build a simple model in which workers and ￿rms may agree to report less than the true
amount of the workers￿earnings to the ￿scal authorities to avoid the payment of taxes and
social security contributions. The minimum wage poses a constraint on this decision and, as
a result, has an e⁄ect on compliance with ￿scal regulation. In particular, when a minimum
wage is introduced or increased, some worker-￿rm pairs prefer to increase their compliance
than to decrease it by going completely underground. Thus, a spike in the distribution of
declared earnings appears at the minimum wage level. Moreover, workers who appear to
receive a higher wage actually experience a drop in their disposable income, as they are
forced to swap undeclared earnings for declared, and taxable, ones. The massive increase
in the minimum wage that took place in Hungary in 2001 represents a quasi experiment to
test this prediction of the model. Hungary is a country where, like in many other developing
and transition countries, underreporting of earnings is widespread. I use panels derived from
the household budget survey to compare the dynamics of food consumption, as a proxy for
true income, and of the consumption-income gap for households that appear to bene￿t from
the minimum wage hike, the treatment group, and for similar but una⁄ected households,
the control group. The analysis consistently shows across di⁄erent speci￿cations that the
treated households experienced a drop in food consumption and in the consumption-income
gap compared to households in the control group, thus supporting the prediction of the
theory. Interestingly, the e⁄ect is present when restricting the sample to skilled workers,
1."Tudta, hogy a pap￿ron minimÆlbØrØrt dolgoz￿k t￿bb mint fele t￿bbet keres annÆl, Øs csak azØrt van
minimÆlbØrre bejelentve, hogy kiker￿lje az ad￿- Øs jÆrulØk￿zetØst?" (own translation).
1while it is not for unskilled or semi-skilled workers. This suggests that relatively more
productive workers may be concealing some of their earnings by declaring the minimum,
while low productivity workers may be genuinely earning the minimum wage.
Undeclared work is a serious issue in many countries. It is di¢ cult to obtain reliable
data on its extent, but raw estimates indicate that the phenomenon is relevant, particularly
in transition and developing countries. In a recent report by Eurostat (2007), based on a
representative survey of individuals in the European Union, 5% of all dependent employees
admitted having received all or part of their salary as envelope wages within the past 12
months. The country with the highest incidence is Romania, with a share of 23%, followed
by Latvia, Bulgaria, Poland, and Lithuania, all with a double digit share, with Estonia and
Hungary just below. In Russia, 8% of the employees reported that they received part of
their income "under the table" (Petrova, 2005). The phenomenon is not limited to Central
and Eastern European economies. The OECD estimates a 30% shortfall in social security
contributions due to undeclared work for Hungary, Mexico and South Korea, and a shortfall
above 20% for Italy, Poland, Spain and Turkey (OECD, 2004a). In Turkey, ￿rms belonging
to the formal sector are estimated to underreport 28% of their wage bill, and for around
50% of the employees enrolled in the Social Security Organization, the wages reported by
employers are at the minimum insurable level (World Bank, 2006). According to the World
Bank, "in Argentina, roughly 15 percent of workers receive pay partly on the books and
partly o⁄the books" (World Bank, 2007). A World Bank study on labor markets in Eastern
Europe and the Former Soviet Union (World Bank, 2005) notices how in several countries
in the region "disproportionately high shares of workers cluster on declared wages at or
just above the minimum wage (with evidence of additional undeclared incomes above the
minimum), creating incentives to sustain a high minimum wage to sustain tax revenue" and
calls for further research on this aspect of minimum wage policy. This is indeed the aim of
this paper.
This work can be seen as integrating two strands of literature. The literature on the
minimum wage is very rich and informs a lively policy debate, mainly focusing on the
e⁄ects on employment2. Recently, several empirical studies have considered the impact of
the minimum wage on aspects other than employment, such as fringe bene￿ts (Simon and
2.See Brown (1999) for a review.
2Kaestner, 20043), prices (Lemos, 2008), pro￿ts (Draca et al., 2011), reservation wages (Falk
et al., 2004). This paper highlights another aspect of minimum wage policy that has not
been considered so far and shows how the minimum wage a⁄ects workers and ￿rms through
the "￿scal channel"4;5. The literature on minimum wage also deals extensively with its
e⁄ects on the wage distribution. A spike at the minimum wage level has been observed in
several instances (see, for instance, DiNardo et al., 1996, Dickens and Manning, 2004). Such
a spike has been de￿ned as a "puzzle" for several standard types of labor market models
(Brown, 1999) and as an "anomalous ￿nding from the standpoint of the standard model of
the low wage labor market" (Card and Krueger, 1995, p. 152). Proposed rationalizations
include reductions in non-wage compensation or increases in required e⁄ort to o⁄set a binding
minimum wage, ￿ atter earnings pro￿les and adjustments in the amounts of hours worked.
The model presented here proposes an alternative rationale for the observed spike in a perfect
competition framework with perfect elasticity of substitution between labor types.
The second strand of literature that this paper addresses deals with the theoretical and
empirical study of tax evasion and the shadow economy6. The literature on tax evasion has
mainly been focused on personal income tax and the compliance decision by an individual
￿lling in the tax declaration form. However, due to the tax withholding and information
reporting systems present in many countries, this is not an accurate description for the case
of employed labor. Indeed, the rate of non-compliance for wages and salaries at the stage of
￿lling the tax declaration form is often negligible. For instance, Klepper and Nagin (1989)
report a mere 0.1% of non-compliance for wages and salaries at this stage in the US, i.e. lower
than for any other income category. Therefore, to study tax evasion by employed labor it
3.In particular, they study how minimum wages a⁄ect the provision of employer health insurance and
pension coverage using US data for 1979-2000 and ￿nd no discernible e⁄ect. Given that fringe bene￿ts can
be used for tax avoidance purposes, the contribution of the present study is complementary to that of Simon
and Kaestner (2004).
4.A related paper is McIntyre (2006), who uses Brazilian data and focuses on estimating the cost associ-
ated with evasion and ￿nds, in line with the assumption in this paper, that there is no ￿xed cost of evading,
while the marginal cost equals 8.1% of the distance from the legal requirement.
5.There is a normative literature that analyzes the role that the minimum wage can play as an instrument
in optimal income taxation. Lee and Saez (2010) analyze the case of a perfectly competitive labor market and
￿nd that a binding minimum wage is desirable if rationing is e¢ cient and the government values redistribution
toward low wage workers.
6.See Andreoni et al. (1998) or Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) for surveys on tax evasion and Schneider
and Enste (2000) for a survey on the shadow economy.
3is necessary to take the interaction between the employer and the employee into account7;8.
Here I model this interaction by developing a novel and simple model of tax evasion based on
the plausible assumption that tax authorities possess an imperfect detection technology. On
the empirical side, this paper contributes to the methodology pioneered by Pissarides and
Weber (1989) to study underreporting by using income and consumption data from household
budget surveys. Pissarides and Weber (1989) study underreporting by self-employed workers
in the UK by assuming expenditure on food to be correctly reported by all income groups,
while income is correctly reported by employees, but underreported by the self-employed.
Instead of food consumption, Feldman and Slemrod (2007) use charitable cash contributions
in unaudited tax returns. They estimate the relationship between charitable contributions
and reported income, depending on the source of income, and attribute to underreporting
the fact that the propensity to make a contribution is higher out of self-employment income
than out of wages and salaries. This methodology has also been used to study underreporting
by private sector employees, using public sector employees as a control group assumed to
correctly report income (Besim and Jenkins, 2005); however, Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova
(2007) take the opposite view in their study on bribery in Ukraine. They use the large
estimated sectorial gap in reported earnings between the public and the private sectors and
the absence of an expenditure gap to identify the size of unreported bribes to public o¢ cials.
A weakness of the approach used in this literature is indeed the need to identify a group
that is not evading. An advantage of the approach used in this paper is that it does not
need to assume that a group truthfully reports income. The minimum wage hike represents
a shock to the "underreporting technology" a⁄ecting some workers but not others and this
variation is exploited to identify the impact of the minimum wage on underreporting. Beside
food consumption, I also use the income-consumption gap, as in Gorodnichenko, Martinez-
Vazquez and Sabirianova (2009) who study tax evasion in Russia by looking at the impact
of the ￿ at tax reform of 2001.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section introduces the model.
7.The study of tax evasion by employed labor is of particular interest as the ￿scal imposition on labor in
the form of social security contributions (SSC) and personal income tax (PIT) represents the bulk of ￿scal
revenues in many countries; for instance labor taxes are the largest source of tax revenue in the EU-25,
representing around half of total tax receipts (Eurostat, 2006).
8.For a recent contribution on the role of ￿rms in tax enforcement see Kleven et al. (2009). Kolm and
Nielsen (2008) study a search model in which workers and ￿rms agree on the amount of income that goes
unreported.
4In section 3, the various e⁄ects of the minimum wage are explored. The following section
tests the implications of the model for disposable income by using Hungarian data. The last
section concludes the paper.
II. The Model Without Minimum W age
The size of the population is exogenously given and normalized to 1. Every individual
is characterized by a productivity yi, distributed in the population according to pdf g(y)
and cdf G(y) on the support [y
ﬂ
; ￿ y], where y
ﬂ
￿ 0. The labor market is competitive, each ￿rm
employs one worker, there is no capital, and production is equal to labor input. Moreover,
there is free entry of ￿rms, ￿rms can observe workers￿productivity, and workers can move
from one ￿rm to another at no cost.
Firms are risk-neutral and maximize expected pro￿ts. In an environment without tax
evasion, pro￿ts for a ￿rm employing a worker with productivity yi are given by
￿i = yi ￿ wi,
where wi is the gross wage9. Firms have an obligation to withhold taxes and social security
contributions and transfer them to the ￿scal authorities. Taxation is at the proportional
rate t 2 (0;1). Workers￿preferences are described by an additively separable concave utility
function, increasing in consumption, C, and decreasing in labor supply, L. I assume that
there is no intensive margin in labor supply. The utility function can be expressed as
U = u(C) ￿ ￿ uL;
where ￿ u is the normalized cost of work and L is an indicator taking the value of 1 if employed
and 0 otherwise. Consumption equals income and net labor income is given by
Ii = wi(1 ￿ t).
The wedge between the gross wage paid by the ￿rm and the net wage received by the
9.No distinction is made between labor cost and gross wage and the two concepts are equivalent in the
model.
5worker, twi, is paid to the ￿scal authorities. Free entry of ￿rms implies that in equilibrium,
the expected pro￿ts are zero which, in turn, in the full compliance case, implies that a worker
with productivity yi would receive a gross wage yi, from which the ￿rm would deduct taxes
tyi, thereby leaving the worker a net wage (1 ￿ t)yi.
In this economy, however, it is possible to evade taxes and social security contributions
by not reporting part or all of the worker￿ s earnings to the authorities. A ￿rm employing a
worker with productivity yi must therefore decide how much of the worker￿ s production to
declare to the tax authorities, xi, and how much to conceal, yi ￿ xi. If xi = yi, the ￿rm is
fully compliant with the regulations. If xi = 0, the full product is hidden from the authorities
and the ￿rm-worker pair operates completely in the black economy. If xi 2 (0;yi), there is
underreporting. A worker-￿rm pair can thus operate in the formal economy, by declaring
a strictly positive income, or be completely in the black market, by declaring nothing. A
worker can also decide to be inactive. In this case, to simplify notation, utility is assumed
to correspond to ￿￿ uL.
Tax authorities may inspect ￿rms to ￿nd out whether they comply with ￿scal regulation.
I assume there to be an exogenously given probability of an audit being performed ￿ 2 [0;1].
Fines proportional to the amount of evasion are imposed on ￿rms in case tax evasion is
detected and, given the assumption of risk-neutral ￿rms and risk-averse workers, there is no
incentive for workers and ￿rms to negotiate a di⁄erent risk-sharing arrangement. However,
the fact that an audit is performed does not imply that the authority with certainty discovers
the true tax liability. Instead, it may ￿nd evidence to impute an income ^ yi 2 [0;yi], where
yi is the true product. Imperfect detection is a plausible assumption and is supported by
empirical evidence. For instance, Feinstein (1991) estimates that IRS examiners on average
managed to detect only half of the tax evasion in the forms they audited10, while Erard
(1997) rejects the hypothesis of perfect detection in his empirical investigation based on the
TCMP (Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program).
I assume that ^ yi is distributed over the support [0;yi]11 according to pdf h(￿) and cdf
H(￿), so that H(0) = 0 and H(yi) = 1, and H(￿) does not depend on xi. To simplify the
10.An IRS study found that for every dollar of underreported income detected by examiners without the
aid of third-party information documents, another $ 2.28 went undetected (cited in Feldman and Slemrod,
2007).
11.The assumption is that the tax authority cannot assess and uphold in a court a tax liability higher
than the true one. To extend the model to situations where this may not be the case, due for instance to
ambiguity in the tax code, would be straightforward.
6discussion, I assume that h(￿) > 0 within the support, so that H(￿) is invertible within [0;yi].
Given a declaration of xi and collected evidence of a true tax liability of ^ yi, the tax
authority imposes on the ￿rm, in case ^ yi > xi , the payment of ￿t(^ yi ￿ xi), consisting of
taxes plus an additional ￿ne proportional to the assessed tax evasion, thus ￿ > 1. In case
^ yi ￿ xi, the tax authority cannot prove any tax evasion, so no ￿ne is imposed12. Given a
true product yi and a reported one xi 2 [0;yi], the expected ￿ne in case of auditing, fi, is
(1) fi = t￿
yi Z
xi
(^ yi ￿ xi)h(^ yi)d^ y.
Below, I determine the equilibrium wage and evasion. For convenience, subscripts are sup-
pressed where not necessary.
II.A. Equilibrium Without Minimum Wage
For a ￿rm employing a worker with productivity y, declaring x, and paying a gross wage
w, the possible realizations of pro￿ts are given by13
￿ =
￿
y ￿ w with probability 1 ￿ ￿
y ￿ w ￿ f with probability ￿ ,
where f, the expected ￿ne in case an audit is conducted, is given by (1). Therefore, the
expected pro￿ts for the ￿rm are
(2) E (￿) = y ￿ w ￿ ￿f.
Income I for a worker employed in a ￿rm paying a gross wage w and declaring to the
￿scal authorities x is given by
(3) I = w ￿ tx.
12.An equivalent narrative is that in an audit, the tax authority may ￿nd no evidence at all of tax
evasion with probability H(xi), which is increasing as the tax liability declared to the authorities increases.
Conditional on detection taking place, the density for any given level of income ^ yi 2 [xi;yi] being discovered
is given by h(^ yi)=[1 ￿ H (xi)].
13.Actually, when an audit is performed, possible realizations of pro￿ts are a continuum, due to the
stochastic nature of the ￿ne. For expositional convenience, the expected value of the ￿ne is considered.
7This expression captures the fact that taxes and social security contributions are deducted
from the worker￿ s declared gross wage x, not from his true gross wage, w. As income is non-
stochastic, income maximization corresponds to utility maximization, given the assumption
that, conditional on being employed, (indirect) utility only depends on net income.
The ￿rm and the worker agree to choose x so as to maximize the expected total surplus
available to them, equivalent to the product minus total expected payments to ￿scal author-
ities, represented by taxes and social security contributions paid on the declared wage and
expected ￿nes. Therefore, the optimal declaration is
(4) x
￿ = arg max
x2[0;y]
y ￿ ￿f ￿ tx.
After substituting (1) into (4), the ￿rst-order condition is
H(x












The second-order condition, ￿t￿￿h(x) < 0, is always satis￿ed. The boundary condition
x ￿ y is always satis￿ed. Notice that full compliance (i.e. x = y) does not take place
unless ￿￿ ! +1. The condition x ￿ 0 implies that full evasion will take place, i.e. x = 0,
when enforcement is very weak, i.e. ￿￿ ￿ 1. To simplify the notation, the two enforcement
parameters are summarized by ￿ ￿ 1=(￿￿). To summarize, the solution to the reporting




H￿1 (1 ￿ ￿) if ￿ < 1
0 if ￿ ￿ 1 .
As @￿=@￿ < 0 and @￿=@￿ < 0 , in an interior solution, the fraction of production that is
evaded decreases as enforcement improves.
The equilibrium ￿ne, f￿, is given by substituting (5) into (1). Substituting this into (2)
and considering the free entry condition, I get the equilibrium gross wage, w￿ = y ￿ ￿f￿,
that when substituted into (3) gives the equilibrium net income
(6) I
￿ = y ￿ ￿f
￿ ￿ tx
￿.
To obtain a closed form solution, from now on I will assume h(￿) to be uniform in the
8support [0;y], i.e. ^ yi s U[0;yi]
14. The expression for the expected ￿ne becomes15
(7) ￿f = ￿t￿(y ￿ x)
2=(2y):
Thus, the cost of evasion is quadratic in the amount of evasion, y ￿ x, as assumed, for





(1 ￿ ￿)y if ￿ < 1
0 if ￿ ￿ 1 :
Thus, the model implies that, irrespective of the speci￿c level of productivity, a constant
fraction of the true tax liability is revealed to the ￿scal authorities. Using (7), the expected




yt￿=2 if ￿ < 1
yt=(2￿) if ￿ ￿ 1




y(1 ￿ t) + ￿yt=2 if ￿ < 1
y [1 ￿ t=(2￿)] if ￿ ￿ 1 .
Given the detection technology, the expected fraction of unreported tax liability, y￿x￿, that




(^ y ￿ x
￿)h(^ y)d^ y=(y ￿ x
￿) = ￿=2,
i.e. a fraction corresponding to half the ratio of evaded income over true product. Thus, it is
relatively easy to get away with tax evasion. For example, in an economy where 30% of the
income is concealed, only 15% of the evasion is, on average, detected in case of auditing.
14.Notice that this assumption is needed to derive simple analytical solutions, but it is not necessary for
the Propositions below to hold. What is actually required is a model that generates an internal solution to
the tax evasion problem through maximization of a smooth utility function that depends on income and in
which declared income increases with productivity.
15.In Tonin (2007) I present an alternative setting for imperfect detection in which the tax authority
devotes an amount of "auditing resources" to every taxpayer. This gives rise to an equivalent expression for
the expected ￿ne.
9III. Effects of the Minimum W age
In this section, I study what are the e⁄ects of introducing a minimum monthly wage $,
with universal coverage, in the economy described in the previous section. Workers cannot
be legally employed at a wage below the minimum, in the sense that their reported gross
wage cannot be below the minimum. The assumption in the model is that the minimum
wage is ￿xed on a monthly basis for full-time work and that no alternative working-time
arrangements are available. This is a good approximation of the Hungarian case, on which
I conduct the empirical analysis16. Moreover, in Tonin (2007), the model is extended to
the case where the minimum wage is ￿xed on an hourly basis, labor supply can vary across
workers and underreporting can involve both hours of work and hourly wage. The results
remain qualitatively unchanged. In the following, I focus on the case with partial evasion,
i.e. ￿ 2 (0;1) 17.
With the introduction of a minimum wage, (4) becomes
x
￿ = arg max
x2f0g[[$;yi]
yi ￿ ￿f ￿ tx.
The only di⁄erence is in the choice set which shrinks from [0;yi] to f0g [ [$;yi]. The
introduction of the minimum wage divides worker-￿rm pairs into three categories:
1. High productivity: yi > $=(1 ￿ ￿)
2. Intermediate productivity: $ ￿ yi ￿ $=(1 ￿ ￿)
3. Low productivity: yi < $:
16.In 2001-2000 part-timers accounted for only 3.6% of all employees. See section IV. for further details on
Hungary. According to Eurostat data from LFS, the share of part-timers in Central and Eastern European
countries is generally low, at around 7% of the employees. Notice that according to the OECD, "To counter
this [under-declaring earnings per employee], the tax authorities may appeal to employment regulations
such as the minimum wage and restrictions on part-time and temporary work. This issue helps explain why
countries with a large informal economy maintain de facto strict employment regulations, even though these
regulations are seen by many analysts as a prime cause of informality." (OECD, 2004, page 227, italics
added).
17.For this to be the case, I need ￿￿ > 1. By assumption ￿ > 1, but ￿, the probability of being subject to
an audit may be low, so this condition may seem restrictive. Notice, however, that in this model, an audit
is extremely ine⁄ective. As already mentioned if, for instance, 30% of income is evaded, only 15% of evaded
income is, on average, discovered during an audit. Thus, instead of a full-￿ edged investigation, an audit
should in the present set-up rather be interpreted as a routine check by the ￿scal authorities, thus occurring
much more frequently than a thorough inquiry.
10Worker-￿rm pairs characterized by high productivity would have declared more than the
minimum wage anyway, so they are una⁄ected by it. The minimum wage is instead a binding
constraint for worker-￿rm pairs that would have declared less in its absence.
In particular, a low productivity worker, i.e. with yi < $, can only work in the black
market or be inactive. The possibility of a worker paying back part of his wage to the ￿rm is
thus excluded. The main results are qualitatively una⁄ected by this modelling choice. What
can be shown is that, if ￿ > t=2, workers with productivity below the minimum wage work
in the black market, otherwise they withdraw from the labor market. Thus, the prediction
is that, for a given tax rate, in economies where enforcement is quite e⁄ective, i.e. ￿ is low,
the minimum wage pushes workers into inactivity and therefore has a negative impact on
e¢ ciency, as productive labor remains idle. Instead, in economies where enforcement is not
very e⁄ective, the minimum wage has no negative impact on e¢ ciency as workers continue
to produce in the black market.
The possibility of declaring the minimum wage and thus participating in the formal
labor market, is available for worker-￿rm pairs characterized by intermediate productivity,
whose optimal declaration in case of no minimum wage regulation is less than $, but with a
productivity above $. What can be shown is that, if the degree of underreporting is low, i.e.
￿ ￿ 1=2, these workers will all increase their compliance and declare the minimum. If ￿ >
1=2, workers with productivity below $=[2(1 ￿ ￿)] will instead work in the black market.18
The right-hand side of Figure 1 depicts declared income as a function of productivity with and
without the minimum wage in the latter case. Declared income when there is no tax evasion
and no minimum wage is also plotted as a reference. It is evident that the introduction of the
minimum wage induces workers with intermediate productivity to increase their declaration,
while higher productivity workers are una⁄ected.
The results are summarized in the below proposition (see Appendix for derivations).
Proposition 1. The introduction of the minimum wage in an economy with underreporting
of earnings induces some workers to increase compliance by increasing declared earnings
to the minimum wage level. Workers with a high productivity are una⁄ected. Workers
18.A corollary of the previous analysis is that the interaction of minimum wage and underreporting
transforms a nominally neutral tax system into a regressive one. Moreover, looking at the impact on total
￿scal revenues, including both revenues due to voluntary compliance and ￿nes, it emerges that revenues
unambigously increase with the minimum wage when underreporting is high (￿ > t=2), while the e⁄ect
depends on the productivity distribution when underreporting is low.
11with a low productivity work in the black market if enforcement is not too e⁄ective,
otherwise they withdraw from the labor force.













(1 ￿ ￿) < x < ￿ y(1 ￿ ￿)
0 otherwise
,
where g(￿) is the pdf of the productivity distribution. After the introduction of the minimum
wage, the distribution of declared earnings is given by
gmw(x) =
8
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if $ < x ￿ ￿ y(1 ￿ ￿)
0 otherwise:
.
Thus, a "smooth" distribution of productivity is associated with a "smooth" distribution of
declared earnings without a minimum wage. However, with the introduction of the minimum
wage, two spikes appear at the minimum wage level and at zero. Without tax evasion,
instead, the distribution would be truncated at the minimum wage. Thus, I can state the
following:
Proposition 2. In a labor market with underreporting of earnings, a spike at the minimum
wage level appears in the distribution of declared earnings .
The left-hand side of Figure 1 depicts disposable income with and without a minimum
wage. There, it is evident that workers experience a decline in their disposable income due
to the introduction of a minimum wage, with the exception of high productivity workers,
who remain una⁄ected.
The following proposition summarizes the e⁄ects of a minimum wage hike on disposable
income (for proof see the Appendix):
Proposition 3. As a result of a minimum wage hike, workers whose declared earnings
before the hike are between the old and the new minimum wage experience a decline in
12income. Other workers are una⁄ected. For those workers declaring the new minimum
wage after the hike, the decline in income increases with the distance between the new
minimum wage and the declared income before the hike.
The intuition behind these results is that increasing the minimum wage e⁄ectively shrinks
the choice set of workers declaring a sum between the new and the old minimum wage in
the previous period, thereby making them worse o⁄. This prediction is di⁄erent from the
standard theory. In a perfectly competitive labor market model without tax evasion, workers
may lose their job due to a minimum wage hike and, in this case, their income would of course
decline. If, however, they keep their job, workers experience a wage hike and, therefore, an
increase in income. This is not the case in this model. Even if workers keep their job,
they experience a decline in income, as their nominal wage hike actually corresponds to an
increase in ￿scal liabilities. This prediction is tested in the following section.
IV. The Empirical Effect of a Minimum W age Hike
on Incomes
I test the prediction of the model by analyzing the e⁄ects of the massive increase in the
minimum wage that took place in Hungary in 2001.
In Hungary underreporting of earnings is widespread. For instance, 56% of the house-
holds interviewed in a survey claim that in their neighborhood, employers are declaring the
minimum wage to the tax authority, while uno¢ cially paying additional wages19 (ECON-
STAT, 1999.) This may be related to the fact that taxation on labor is very heavy in general,
and this is also the case for low paid workers. In the period 2000-2002, the tax wedge on
a single person without children earning two thirds of the average production wage was at
around 46%, i.e. one of the highest in Europe, with marginal rates above 55% (OECD, 2001
and 2002).
19.The failure to correctly report tax liability involves the payment of a penalty corresponding to 50% of
the tax evaded, plus late payment interest corresponding to twice the prime rate of the Hungarian National
Bank, at around 11% in the period 2000-2001, for up to three years (OECD, 2004b). Economic organizations
with legal entity status were in the period 2000-2001 subject to a 45% "audit intensity", de￿ned as the number
of completed audits in the tax year (without cash-￿ ow audits) divided by the number of taxpayers in the
given taxpayer group at the end of the previous year. The corresponding number for economic organizations
without legal entity status was around 19% (APEH, 2006).
13The statutory minimum wage20 was increased from 25,500 HUF in 2000 (98 EUR or 90
USD using the average exchange rate for the corresponding year) to 40,000 HUF in 2001
(156 EUR, 140 USD.) As a consequence, the corresponding total monthly payments to the
￿scal authorities (PIT and SSC) increased by around 9,000 HUF (36 EUR, 32 USD)21. It is
interesting to notice how the hike was decided one-sidedly by the centre-right government,
against the opposition of the largest trade union federation. The share of full-time employees
paid 95%-105% of the minimum wage in ￿rms employing more than ￿ve workers jumped
from 5% in 2000 to 12.1% in 2001 (Kertesi and K￿ll‰ o, 2003). The impact of this massive
hike on the labor market, however, was modest. Kertesi and K￿ll‰ o (2003) compare the job
loss risk of workers earning 90-110% of the minimum wage in 2001 to that of workers earning
110-125% and ￿nd only a small e⁄ect on the quarterly out￿ ow into unemployment22, while
they ￿nd no e⁄ect on the ￿ ow from employment to non-participation. They also ￿nd a high
level of compliance with the minimum wage regulation, with only a minor spillover on the
wage distribution23. The conclusion of their study is that ￿despite the brutal price shock
the immediate e⁄ect did not seem dramatic￿ . Overall, in the period 2000-2001, the activity
rate remained stable at around 60%, with unemployment declining from 6.4% to 5.7% and
youth unemployment from 12.5% to 11.3% (see Table 2 for more details).
Hungary is thus an ideal case to study the interaction between tax evasion and minimum
wage: underreporting is widespread and in 2001 a massive minimum wage hike took place
with a modest impact on the labor market. To the best of my knowledge, no other institu-
tional change took place at the same time that may a⁄ect income or consumption. In what
20.The statutory minimum wage covers all employment contracts and relates to gross monthly earnings
net of overtime pay, shift pay and bonuses for full-time employment. For part-timers, it is proportionally
lower, but part-timers only account for a small portion of all employees (3.6% in 2001-2002). Regarding
contractual types, the only source of data I am aware of, the Hungarian Unemployment Insurance Exit to
Job Survey, reports that 64.7% of the low-wage UI recipients who found a job in April 2001 received a ￿xed
salary, 33.8% were paid an hourly wage and the remaining 1.5% concluded a business contract with the
employer (Kertesi and K￿ll‰ o, 2003). Thus, the model assumption of a monthly minimum wage is well suited
for the Hungarian case.
21.See Table 1 for details.
22.For a 25-year old male with ￿ve years of tenure, for instance, the estimated quarterly ￿ ow is 0.243%
for the treated and 0.119% for the control group. At average age and tenure of the control group (40,
7.33), the ￿gures are 0.0168% for the treated and 0.0068% for the control group. Average age and tenure
of the treatment group are not very di⁄erent at 39.2 and 6.67, respectively. Notice that both these rates
indicate rather long prospective tenures and thus a very modest job-loss risk, even for workers a⁄ected by
the minimum wage.
23.Looking at the job ￿nding probability, they ￿nd a 7-8% drop for the low-wage unemployed, de￿ned as
those receiving lower than average unemployment bene￿ts, relative to the unskilled as a whole, de￿ned as
those with less than secondary education.
14follows, I describe the empirical methodology and results.
IV.A. The Statistical Framework
The prediction of the model derived in the previous section is that as a consequence of
a minimum wage hike disposable income, I, declines for workers a⁄ected by the minimum
wage hike, i.e. ￿I < 0, while it does not change for una⁄ected workers. Disposable income is
the sum of after-tax declared labor income, (1 ￿ t)x, other declared income and undeclared
income. A⁄ected workers who do not go completely underground experience an increase
in after-tax declared income that is more than compensated for by a decline in undeclared
income, so that disposable income indeed declines. This is due to the fact that declaring
previously undeclared income makes it subject to taxation.
Given that the empirical methodology is based on consumption data and that consump-
tion is observed at the household level, the analysis is conducted at the household level. In
particular, disposable income at the household level is the sum of disposable income for all
household members, Y =
P
j Ij, and equals the sum of after-tax declared income at the
household level, Y D, and undeclared income at household level, Y U,
(12) Y = Y
D + Y
U.
To test the prediction of the model, in the empirical analysis I ￿rst look at the dynamics
of food consumption, as a proxy for the unobservable disposable income, for households that
appear to bene￿t from the minimum wage hike, the treatment group, and for similar but
una⁄ected households, the control group. The use of food consumption is standard in the
literature estimating tax evasion by using household budget survey data. This is due to the
fact that food consumption is more precisely recorded than consumption of other types of
goods. This is the case also for the dataset used here: data on consumption of food and some
other items, e.g. some types of clothing, come from a diary that each household keeps in a
given month during the year, while expenditures of more signi￿cant value are retrospectively
collected for the year as a whole in subsequent interviews (see the Appendix and KapitÆny
and MolnÆr, 2004, for more details).
After analyzing food consumption, I look at the consumption-income gap function. The
advantage of using the consumption-income gap is that it employs a more comprehensive
15measure of consumption and it eliminates the need to control for the possibly endogenous
income change.
If households are credit-constrained, then consumption for household i at time t, Ci;t,
depends on disposable income, so that
(13) Ci;t = Zi;t￿ + ￿Yi;t + error,
where Zi;t is a row vector of household characteristics. Taking ￿rst di⁄erences, I get
(14) ￿Ci = ￿Zi￿ + ￿￿Yi + error,
and substituting expression (12) for disposable income,





The change in unreported income, ￿Y U
i , is unobservable, but according to the theory, the
minimum wage hike represents a shock to the "underreporting technology" for some house-
holds as some of their members are forced to decrease underreporting to remain employed in
the formal labor market. Households una⁄ected by the minimum wage hike should instead
not change their reporting behavior. This variation is used to identify the impact of the
minimum wage on tax evasion. Thus, the following speci￿cation is estimated in the case of
food consumption
(16) ￿Ci = # + ￿Zi￿ + ￿￿Y
D
i + ￿TREATi + "i,
whereas I estimate
(17) ￿Ci ￿ ￿Y
D
i = # + ￿Zi￿ + ￿TREATi + "i
when looking at the consumption-income gap. ￿Ci is the change in food consumption (when
estimating (16)) or some aggregate measure of consumption (when estimating (17)) in two
consecutive years, # is a constant, TREATi is an indicator of whether a given household have
been a⁄ected by the minimum wage hike, the exact de￿nition of which is provided below,
and "i is a random error term. This speci￿cation is similar to the one used in Johnson,
16Parker, and Souleles (2006) to study the impact of the 2001 federal income tax rebates on
consumption expenditures. The coe¢ cient of interest is ￿ and the theory predicts it to be
negative.
If households are not credit-constrained and consumption depends on permanent income,
Y P, then expressions (13) and (14) should have Y P
i;t instead of Yi;t. Assuming the relationship
between the change in permanent income and the change in disposable income is given by
(18) ￿Y
P
i = ￿￿Yi + error,
then (15) becomes





and can still be estimated through (16) and (17). The di⁄erence is that now in "i there
is also the error term from expression (18). Particular care must thus be taken not to
confound the shock to the ability to underreport with other shocks to permanent income
related to the minimum wage hike due, for instance, to increased labor market risk. For
this reason, I consider in the analysis only employees who remained employed for at least
12 months after the hike: their employment status is clearly not adversely a⁄ected by the
minimum wage hike in this period. Also, in some speci￿cations, I control for a rich set
of employee characteristics and geographical dummies, thus controlling for possible shocks
along these dimensions. Moreover, I conduct a separate analysis for the subsamples of
skilled and unskilled/semi-skilled workers a⁄ected by the hike. If the negative treatment
e⁄ect is due to increased labor market risk, then unskilled/semi-skilled workers should be
more a⁄ected compared to skilled workers. Instead, what I ￿nd is the opposite, with skilled
workers experiencing a negative treatment e⁄ect, while the less productive unskilled/semi-
skilled workers are not a⁄ected. This is consistent with the relatively more productive skilled
workers receiving part of their compensation in cash, while unskilled/semi-skilled may be
genuinely earning the minimum wage.
The preferred speci￿cation is in levels as the shock to underreporting is not proportional
to income but absolute. According to the model, every worker declaring the minimum wage
in 2000 and then increasing his declaration to the new minimum in 2001 experiences a
decline in his income of around 9,000 HUF, irrespective of di⁄erences in the income level
17that may arise from the availability of other sources of income or heterogeneity in the degree
of underreporting. However, I also report the results for a log speci￿cation, using ￿lnCi
and ￿lnY D
i . A log speci￿cation is less sensitive to outliers and, in the analysis of the
consumption-income gap, the assumption of unitary income elasticity of consumption may
be more appealing than the assumption of an unitary ratio.
All regressions include a set of dummies allowing for di⁄erent trends depending on the
months in which the household is surveyed in two consecutive years. These dummies con-
trol for time shocks, e.g. seasonal ￿ uctuations in food prices. As already mentioned, a set
of regressions also includes controls for all employee characteristics available in the dataset
(sector of employment, position, type of employer), for geographical characteristics (county
and type of settlement) and demographic characteristics (age and gender of household mem-
bers). These variables control, for instance, for labor market shocks that are speci￿c to a
given sector or to a speci￿c area of the country or for di⁄erences in food in￿ ation among
di⁄erent types of settlements, e.g. cities or villages.
The exact de￿nition of all variables is provided in the Appendix.
IV.B. Empirical Implementation
I use data from the Hungarian Household Budget Survey Rotation Panel24, in particular
the 2000-2001 panel. More information about the way the survey is conducted is available in
the Appendix and in KapitÆny and MolnÆr (2004). It is worth underlining that surveyors are
expected to collect the income data from documentation like the tax return sheet or the tax
certi￿cation of the employer. This makes it more likely that income in the survey corresponds
to income reported to the ￿scal authorities, rather than to the possibly di⁄erent true income.
The distribution of earnings in the dataset (see Figure 2) clearly shows the impact of the
minimum wage hike at the low end of the earnings distribution, with no evidence of spillovers
at earnings above the minimum. Also, a spike at the minimum wage level is evident for 2001
(a histogram representation, not presented here, clearly shows a spike in both 2000 and 2001,
with 5% and 14% of employees in the sample earning the minimum wage. These ￿gures are
24.The Hungarian Household Budget Survey Rotation Panel is created by the Institute of Economics (IE),
Hungarian Academy of Sciences from the original HHBS of the Hungarian Central Statistical O¢ ce. The
data set is work in progress. The IE made every e⁄ort to clean the data and it cannot be held liable for any
remaining errors.
18consistent with LFS data. The smaller spike for 2000 is not evident in Figure 2 due to
smoothing.)
I consider a household as treated if at least one of its members has been a⁄ected by
the minimum wage hike. In particular, the variable TREATi contains the total number
of members of household i classi￿ed as private sector employees (see Appendix for exact
de￿nitions) who have been employed for the whole period and who in the year 2000 earn
a wage between the minimum wage in that year (25,500 HUF) and the will-be minimum
wage in the year 2001 (40,000 HUF). I also report results from an alternative speci￿cation in
which TREATi is a dummy variable indicating whether a household has at least one member
satisfying the abovementioned criteria. The control group is represented by households not
in the treatment group where at least one member has been employed for the whole period
and whose wage in 2000 is between the minimum wage in 2000 and 200% of the will-be
minimum wage in 2001. The treatment group and control group are thus only de￿ned on
the basis of pre-treatment characteristics. I consider only employees with stable positions,
i.e. employees who have been employed for the whole of 2000 and who keep their job for
at least 12 months after the minimum wage hike, to avoid confounding an increase in labor
market risk with an increase in compliance with ￿scal regulation. To ensure comparability, I
restrict the analysis to households that kept a constant composition and that have a positive
monthly net income below 200,000 HUF at 2000 prices (approx. 770 EUR). I also consider
a speci￿cation in which I further restrict the sample to households with monthly net income
between 50,000 HUF (approx. 190 EUR) and 150,000 HUF (approx. 580 EUR) at 2000
prices.
I also employ an alternative de￿nition of treatment, in which the variable TREATi is the
sum within household i of the di⁄erence between the minimum wage in 2001 and earnings in
2000 for all members of the household de￿ned as treated according to the previous criteria.
The aim of this continuous measure is to capture the intensity of treatment. I label this
de￿nition of treatment "continuous".
Exit from the Labor Market As mentioned earlier, I do not consider workers who lose
their job after the minimum wage hike. A drop in income for this type of worker can be
easily explained by their job loss and would be a confounding factor to detect the alternative
explanation proposed here, namely the fact that there is a fall in the e⁄ective wage due to a
19reshu› ing between declared and undeclared earnings. However, following a minimum wage
hike, the model also predicts some exit from the formal labor market, either to the informal
labor market or to inactivity, and here I will brie￿ y look at this aspect.
Looking at the impact of the minimum wage on the probability of becoming unem-
ployed25, of the 301 individuals who were employed in the private sector for the whole of
2000 at a wage between the minimum wage in 2000 and the will-be minimum wage in 2001,
6.6% (20 individuals) were unemployed in 2001. The ￿gure is slightly higher for skilled work-
ers (7.5%, 11 out of 135) than for unskilled or semi-skilled workers (6.5%, 8 out of 115), while
it is lower (3.1%, 1 out of 31) for workers with higher occupations. A probit analysis shows
that, among those having a stable position in 2000, the probability of being unemployed
in 2001 is, after controlling for a rich set of variables26, 0.031 (s.e. 0.017) higher for whose
with a wage in 2000 between 25,500-40,000 HUF, compared to whose with a wage between
40,000-80,000 HUF. This ￿gure is 0.038 (s.e. 0.028) for skilled workers and 0.003 (s.e. 0.013)
for unskilled or semi-skilled workers. An increase in the probability of being unemployed is
consistent with the model, but is of course also the standard prediction of most labor market
models, in particular taking into account the size of the minimum wage hike.27
One aspect to underline here is that workers who do not lose their job after the minimum
wage hike are the ones more likely to receive a cash side-payment. This is because unre-
ported income may act as a bu⁄er to absorb the minimum wage shock. Such a bu⁄er is not
available to workers complying with ￿scal regulation, who are thus more likely to become
unemployed. Therefore, to correctly interpret the results, it should be taken into account
that side payments are likely to be more common in the sample used for the analysis than
for the population of workers as a whole, even if, given the limited e⁄ect of the minimum
wage on unemployment described above, this sample selection issue may not be very serious.
Descriptive Statistics Households in the treatment group and in the control group are
quite similar (see Table 3). In 2001, income of households in the treatment group is 95%
25.Formally, unemployed people are not outside of the o¢ cial labor market. However, none of the subjects
under consideration are classi￿ed in 2001 as "person with no intention to work".
26.Age, age square, gender, county, type of settlement, family status, sector, position, education.
27.Unskilled and semi-skilled workers should be more likely than skilled ones to lose their job due to a
minimum wage hike, both according to the model presented here and to a model without tax evasion. The
￿gures above go in the opposite direction; however, it is not possible to draw any reliable conclusion based
on them, as they are based on very few observations.
20of income of households in the control group for the sample as a whole and indeed there is
considerable overlap in the distribution of income (see Figure 3). This is due to the fact that
workers a⁄ected by the minimum wage are not the sole earners in the household. Indeed, in
Hungary ￿minimum wage earners are typically not the primary earners ￿the breadwinners
￿in their families, and they do not typically fall within the poorest ￿fth of the population￿
(Benedek et al., 2006). Both types of household spend around 25% of net income on food
and the estimated relationship between food consumption and income in the pre-treatment
period is very similar (see Figure 4). In the post-treatment period, the same is true for the
unskilled/semi-skilled group, while there appears to be a divergence for the skilled group
at relatively high income levels. In particular, in the post-treatment period, households
in the treatment group with an income above HUF 100,000 appear to be consuming less
food than households with comparable levels of income in the control group. This is indeed
consistent with the implication of a minimum wage hike underlined in this paper; namely
that households in the treatment group have been forced to declare more of their true income,
while households in the control group were una⁄ected.
Food Consumption In Table 4, I report estimation results for equation (16). I also report
results without controlling for income change. To deal with the possible correlation between
the treatment and the error term due, for instance, to a mean-reverting transitory component
of income or to changes in the distribution of income (Auten and Carroll, 1999; Gruber and
Saez, 2002; Kopczuk, 2005), in some speci￿cations I also control for the initial level of
income. In the baseline speci￿cation, I control for month dummies. I report results where I
also control for geographical, demographical and employee characteristics, thus allowing for
di⁄erent trends across these dimensions. Beside food consumption, I also report results for
the baseline speci￿cation using the aggregate measure of consumption that will be employed
in the consumption-income gap analysis. As mentioned above, I report results for di⁄erent
subsamples. First of all, in Table 5, I restrict attention to skilled workers only, to de￿ne
both the treatment and the control group. Then, in Table 6, I restrict attention to unskilled
and semi-skilled workers only. The ￿rst subsample includes more than 50% of the treated
households in the original sample, while the second subsample includes more than 40%.
What emerges from this analysis is that, as predicted by the theory, there is a negative and
signi￿cant treatment e⁄ect for skilled workers, while for unskilled and semi-skilled workers
21the treatment coe¢ cient is instead of much smaller magnitude, often positive and never
statistically signi￿cant. For the sample as a whole, the coe¢ cient of interest is negative, even
if of a smaller magnitude than for the skilled-workers subsample, and statistically signi￿cant
when looking at the change in food consumption.
To check for the validity of the control group, in the middle part of Tables 4, 5, and 6,
I report the results of a "placebo test", where I ascertain the absence of a treatment e⁄ect
in the pre-policy period. For this purpose, I replicate the analysis by looking at changes in
consumption in the period 1999-2000. This placebo test con￿rms the validity of the control
group, as the dynamic of consumption did not di⁄er between the treatment and control
group in the pre-treatment period 1999-2000.
In the lower part of Tables 4, 5, and 6, I use a subsample of households with a mid-range
income (50,000-150,000 HUF). The treatment e⁄ect is negative and signi￿cant when looking
at food consumption for the skilled subsample and for the whole sample when there are
additional controls, while in the other cases statistical signi￿cance is not achieved and, for
the unskilled subsample, the coe¢ cient is generally positive (but insigni￿cant). The weaker
results for this subsample may be related to the exclusion of households with an income in the
150,000-200,000 HUF range. As underlined above referring to Figure 4, it appears that the
divergence between treatment and control groups in the post-treatment period is particularly
evident at relatively high income levels. Indeed, repeating the analysis for the subsample of
households with income in the 100,000-200,000 HUF range (results not reported) also gives
a signi￿cantly negative treatment e⁄ect for the change in food consumption in the baseline
speci￿cation, without additional controls.
Finally, Table 7 reports results for the alternative speci￿cations of the treatment variable
descibed at the beginning of this section. Regardless of the speci￿cation, the treatment
e⁄ect is signi￿cantly negative for the skilled subsample in the 2000-2001 period, while for
the unskilled subsample there is no signi￿cant e⁄ect. When considering all skill levels,
the speci￿cation in logs does not give signi￿cant results, as is the case for the mid-income
subsample. Also here, considering the subsample of households with income in the 100,000-
200,000 HUF range gives a signi￿cant negative treatment e⁄ect regardless of the speci￿cation
of treatment also when considering all skill levels.
All in all, these results are consistent with the enforcement role of the minimum wage
proposed here. Indeed, skilled workers are more likely to receive a higher compensation
22due to their higher productivity and, thus, if they declare a wage close to the minimum
wage, to receive additional payments in cash. Therefore, in the case of skilled workers,
an increase in the minimum wage is more likely to represent an increase in ￿scal liability.
Instead, unskilled and semi-skilled workers have lower productivity and thus they are less
likely to receive additional side payments over and above the declared minimum wage. Notice
also that the interpretation of the negative coe¢ cient of the treatment variable as a result of
increased labor market risk would imply the opposite pattern, with unskilled and semi-skilled
workers being more a⁄ected than skilled workers.
Consumption-Income Gap In Table 8, I report estimation results for equation (17).
The measure of consumption I use in the baseline speci￿cation is labelled C2 and includes
consumption of non-durable goods plus transfers payments (e.g. maintenance for child out-
side the household). The measure of income, Y2, includes regular labor and non-labor income
plus irregular receipts (e.g. income from the sales of belongings). I report results controlling
only for month dummies (Time controls) or also for geographical, demographical and em-
ployee characteristics (Full controls). I report results for all three de￿nitions of treatment
(baseline, dummy and continuous), both for the speci￿cation in levels (upper part of the
table) and, in case of the baseline and dummy treatments, also for the speci￿cation in logs
(lower part of the table). Beside results for the whole sample, I report, as in the analysis of
food consumption, results for the subsamples of skilled workers and unskilled/semi-skilled
workers. Finally, the right-hand side of the table contains results for the subsample of mid-
income households. In Table 9, I report results for the baseline speci￿cation of the treatment
with an alternative measure of consumption including only non-durable goods, C1, and an
alternative measure of income including only regular income, Y1. Results using these alter-
native measures are not qualitatively a⁄ected when considering the di⁄erent speci￿cations
of treatments as in Table 8 (results not reported).
For the sample as a whole, the coe¢ cient of the treatment variable is always negative, as
predicted by the theory. Statistical signi￿cance is achieved mainly for the baseline treatment
speci￿cation and for the log speci￿cation. As in the case of food consumption, the analysis
of subsamples clearly indicates that skilled workers are the ones a⁄ected by the treatment,
while unskilled/semi-skilled are not. So, all in all, the analysis of the Consumption-Income
gap con￿rms the results derived from the analysis of food consumption.
23Robustness checks I repeated the main analysis for two ￿ctitious minimum wage hikes:
an increase from 50,000 HUF to 64,500 HUF and an increase from 50,000 HUF to 78,431
HUF. The starting point of 50,000 HUF has been chosen so that there is no overlap between
individuals a⁄ected by the real hike and the ones considered to be a⁄ected by the ￿ctitious
hike. The end points have been chosen so that the absolute di⁄erence between the two
minimum wages or their ratio is the same as in the real case. All other quantities have been
modi￿ed accordingly. For these two ￿ctitious cases (results not reported), the treatment
is neither consistently negative, nor signi￿cant, irrespective of the di⁄erent treatment def-
initions used. This indicates that the treatment e⁄ect found in the main analysis is not a
statistical artifact or due to a comparison of households in di⁄erent positions in the income
distribution, but is indeed due to the minimum wage hike.
To summarize, treated households experience a signi￿cant drop in their consumption
compared to households in the control group. This is the case even if they appear to actually
bene￿t from the minimum wage hike, in that their reported net income increases more than
for the control group, both in absolute and in relative terms. Moreover, the fact that the
e⁄ect is due to the skilled workers subsample excludes the alternative explanation of an
increase in the labor market due to the minimum wage. Thus, we can conclude that the
empirical analysis supports the theoretical prediction about the minimum wage impact on
￿scal compliance.
V. Conclusions
This paper examines an aspect of minimum wage policy that has not been investigated
before, by looking at its interaction with tax evasion by employed labor. There are important
policy implications for countries where underreporting of earnings is a relevant phenomenon.
On the one hand, if the aim of the minimum wage hike is to boost income for those a⁄ected,
as is often claimed when such policies are introduced, the policy move could have opposite
consequences, if no corrective measures are taken on the ￿scal side. An increase in o¢ cially
reported income could actually correspond to a decrease in true income, unless the minimum
wage hike is accompanied by a decrease in ￿scal pressure for minimum wage earners. On the
other hand, the minimum wage could be used as an instrument to contrast underreporting of
earnings. The minimum wage targets the lower end of the productivity distribution, but this
24may be desirable as there is some evidence that tax evasion among employees is concentrated
here (Lemieux et al. [1994]; Fiorio and D￿ Amuri [2005]). Admittedly, the minimum wage
represents a rather blunt instrument to ￿ght underreporting, but it may be sharpened by
di⁄erentiating it along dimensions related to productivity (see for instance the Bulgarian
experience [Koleva, 2007; Neykov, 2003]). It has to be noted, however, that there may be
other instruments available to ￿ght evasion (e.g. a reform of the statutory tax rates) and
whether a minimum wage policy should be part of an optimal policy mix is an open question
that the positive analysis conducted in this paper cannot address.
There are also implications for the most researched aspect of minimum wage policy, i.e.
its e⁄ect on employment. Unreported income may act as a bu⁄er to absorb minimum wage
shocks, implying that the employment e⁄ect of a minimum wage hike would be smaller
in countries with a high degree of informality compared to countries where the degree of
informality is lower. An example of this is the subdued employment e⁄ect of the massive
minimum wage hike that took place in Hungary in 2001. The paper also contributes to the
literature on tax evasion by introducing a new and simple way of modelling it, based on
the idea that detection is not perfect. This can be used to study other aspects of reporting
behavior and tax enforcement.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
For low productivity workers, I get income in case of work in the black market, i.e. full
evasion, from (10),
(20) Ibm ￿ yi [1 ￿ t=(2￿)].
To simplify notation, income in case of inactivity is assumed to be 0 and utility to be ￿￿ uL.
The labor market status is then chosen by comparing utility in the two cases, giving the
following condition
Ibm > 0 , ￿ > t=2.
25Intermediate productivity workers satisfy the following condition,
(21) (1 ￿ ￿)yi ￿ $ ￿ yi , $ ￿ yi ￿ $=(1 ￿ ￿).
Their income in case of declaring $ is given by substituting x = $ in (7) and (6)
(22) Imw ￿ yi(1 ￿ t) + (yi ￿ $)t ￿ t(yi ￿ $)
2 =(2￿yi).
Declaring a wage higher than the minimum is never optimal for this group. Moreover, as
Imw > 0 for productivities satisfying (21), these workers will never go into inactivity. The
choice is thus between declaring the minimum wage or working in the black market and
declaring 0. The comparison between income in case of declaring the minimum wage and
income in the black market as given by (20) gives the following condition
(23) Imw ￿ Ibm , yi ￿ $=[2(1 ￿ ￿)] ￿ ymw.
As the choice between employment at the minimum wage and employment in the black
market is only relevant for workers satisfying (21) to determine the behavior once a minimum
wage is introduced, it is necessary to position ymw in the interval [$;$=(1 ￿ ￿)]. The
threshold ymw is greater than the minimum wage if and only if ￿ > 1=2, while it is always
the case that ymw < $=(1 ￿ ￿). Thus, if the degree of underreporting is high, i.e. ￿ > 1=2,
the threshold ymw is internal to the interval de￿ned by condition (21). This implies that
some of the workers a⁄ected by the minimum wage and with a productivity higher than the
minimum wage prefer to decrease evasion and declare the minimum, while others prefer to
go into the black market. If the degree of underreporting is instead low, i.e. ￿ ￿ 1=2, all
workers a⁄ected by the minimum wage and with a productivity higher than the minimum
wage prefer to increase compliance and declare the minimum.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Suppose that in the ￿rst period, the minimum wage is $1, increasing to $2 > $1 in the
second period. The change in income due to the minimum wage hike is ￿I = I2 ￿I1, where
It is income in period t.
If a worker already operates in the underground market or declares earnings above $2 in
26the ￿rst period, he will not change his behavior after the minimum wage hike and thus his
income remains unchanged, ￿I = 0. A worker whose o¢ cial earnings are exactly equal to
the minimum wage in the ￿rst period, $1, may experience an increase in declared earnings
to $2, with a corresponding income change of
￿I = ￿t($2 ￿ $1)[$2 + $1 ￿ 2y(1 ￿ ￿)]=(2￿y) < 0,
as workers in this situation have productivity yi s.t. (1 ￿ ￿)yi ￿ $1 < $2. Alternatively,
his declared earnings may decrease to 0. The income change in this case is given by
￿I = t$1 [$1 ￿ 2y(1 ￿ ￿)]=(2￿y) < 0,
as workers in this situation have productivity yi s.t. yi > $1 if ￿ ￿ 1=2 and yi >
$1=[2(1 ￿ ￿)] if ￿ > 1=2. This assumes that workers go underground. If ￿ < t=2, so
that workers withdraw from the labor market, the decline in income is obvious. In any case,
the minimum wage hike results in an income decline for this type of worker. The last type
of worker to be analyzed here is the one with declared earnings between the old and new
minimum wage in the ￿rst period. Also in this case declared earnings may increase in the
second period to $2, resulting in an income drop given by
￿I = ￿t[y (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ $2]
2 =(2y￿) < 0,
or decrease to 0, with the corresponding income change given by
￿I = ￿ty (1 ￿ ￿)
2 =(2￿) < 0.
Also here, this assumes that workers go underground, while, if workers withdraw from the
labor market, the decline in income is obvious. Notice that the decline in income for workers
declaring $2 in the second period increases as the distance between the declared income in
the ￿rst period and $2 increases. Thus, a worker who was declaring marginally above the
minimum wage $1 in the ￿rst period and increases his declaration to $2 experiences a larger
income decline than a worker also declaring $2 in the second period, but whose declared
income in the ￿rst period was higher. The income decline is even larger for workers who
27declared the minimum wage in the ￿rst period.
The survey and main variables
The sample consists of around 10,000 households. One third of the sample is rotated
in each year. The two-year panels of interest for this study, i.e. 1999-2000 and 2000-2001,
contain slightly more than 3,500 households. Notice that households interviewed from 1999
till 2001 appear in both panels, so that around half of the sample is the same in the two panels.
The population of interest is considerably reduced by the fact that all adults are retirees in
around 40% of the households. A household consists of individuals forming a common
income and/or consumption unit, completely or partly sharing the current costs of living.
The selection of the sample is done by a multistrata method using census data. In a given
month during the year, households keep a diary registering income and expenditure during
the month and ￿general household characteristics￿containing demographic, employment and
housing data. In subsequent interviews, data on personal incomes, family income, stock of
consumer durables and expenditures of signi￿cant value, are retrospectively collected for the
year as a whole. The main variables and categories used are:
￿ "Households with constant family structure" are households where the same individuals
are present for the relevant period. Restricting the analysis to this type of household
reduces the sample in the panel 1999-2000 from 3581 to 3181, with a loss of 400
households; for the panel 2000-2001 the loss is of 329 households, from 3529 to 3200.
The advantage of only using such households is that exactly the same individuals are
observed in two subsequent years.
￿ In all regressions I include a set of dummies capturing the month of diary keeping. So,
for instance in the panel 2000-2001, there is a dummy for households that kept the
diary in January 2000 and January 2001 and a di⁄erent dummy for households that
kept the diary in January 2000 and February 2001. Potentially, there are 144 month
dummies. However, in both panels, around 70% of the households kept the diary in
the same month in both years.
￿ "Employees" are de￿ned as employees in public or private enterprises, institutions,
co-operatives, private entrepreneurs or societies (￿rms owned by several private entre-
preneurs) with positive earnings from their main activity during the year and positive
28months when earnings from the main activity have been realized. "Public employees"
are de￿ned as employees in the category "public or private enterprises, institutions",
active in public administration and defence, compulsory social security, education, or
health and social work. "Private employees" are all employees who are not public em-
ployees. The dataset contains the number of months in which earnings from the main
activity have been realized during the year. If in a given year the number of months
corresponds to twelve, the employee is considered to have been employed the whole
year.
￿ Employee characteristics include three sets of dummies, describing the labor market
characteristics of employees in the households.
1. Sectoral: =1 for each of the 16 NACE categories if there are employees in the
household working in that category (e.g. electricity, gas and water supply);
2. Position: =1 for each of the 10 categories characterizing the hierarchical posi-
tion28 if there are employees in the household belonging to that category (e.g.
skilled worker);
3. Type of employer: =1 if there are employees in the household working for a given
category of employers29 (e.g. private entrepreneurs);
￿ Geographical dummies include a set of dummies for the 20 counties into which Hungary
is divided and a set of dummies capturing whether the household￿ s place of residence is
the capital, a large city, a town or a village. Note that by construction, in subsequent
years, the survey only includes households whose place of residence did not change.
￿ Demographic characteristics include variables indicating the number of household mem-
bers with age 0-5, 6-20, 21-35, 36-50, 51-65, >65 and the number of male household
members.
28.Top leader; leader, manager; employee with diploma; employee with secondary quali￿cation; adminis-
trative employee; skilled worker; semi-skilled worker; unskilled worker; self-employed; family helper.
29.In 1999, the following three categories are listed: 1. public or private enterprises, institutions; 2.
cooperatives, ￿rm owned by several private entrepreneurs; 3. private entrepreneurs.
In 2000 and 2001, the following four categories are listed: 1. public or private enterprises, institutions; 2.
cooperatives; 3. private entrepreneurs; 4. ￿rm owned by several private entrepreneurs.
29￿ Consumption and income variables:
1. Food consumption is built from a detailed list (e.g. eggs, whole milk, skimmed
milk). For each item there is a distinction between own production and pur-
chased.
2. C1 includes food, beverages and cigarettes, clothes, energy, water, rent, trans-
port, health and personal care, communication, culture and recreation, and other
personal costs. Both purchased and own production are included. It does not
include durables like furniture and applicances, and vehicles.
3. C2 also includes outgoing household transfers, both in cash and in kind.
4. Y1 includes household level income (various forms of child-related income, e.g.
family allowance, social assistance, e.g. food support, and other sources of in-
come, e.g. income from dividends or interest), income from own production, in-
cluding own production of food, and the sum of net personal incomes of household
members, e.g. income from main activity, self-employment, authorship, where
paid social security contributions and personal income tax are subtracted from
gross personal income to obtain net personal income. This is the measure of in-
come used to select the sample (households with positive income below 200,000
HUF and households with income between 50,000-150,000 HUF at 2000 prices,
de￿ ated using CPI).
5. Y2 also includes irregular receipts, e.g. income from sales of belonging and non-
refundable social loans for housing.
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Figure 1: Disposable Income (I) and Declared Income (x)  
























































































































kernel = triangle, bandwidth =  4.1e+03
UNSKILLED/SEMIïSKILLED
The vertical lines indicate the MW in 2000 (25000) and 2001 (40000)
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kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth =  1.6e+04
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Lowess smoothing ( bandwidth: 0.25). Red: treatment group; Black: control group
	 ﾠTables	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠTax	 ﾠWedge	 ﾠon	 ﾠMinimum	 ﾠWage	 ﾠ
      2000  2001 
   25500  40000 
Monthly minimum wage (gross) 
   98 €  156 € 
Personal income tax rate at minimum wage  20%  20% 
 - Rate  10%  10% 
 - Monthly Maximum  3000  3000  Tax credit  
 - Applicable at minimum 
wage  2550  3000 
 - Rate  25%  25% 
Pension contribution deduction   - Rate*Employee Pension 
Rate  2%  2% 
Net personal income tax at minimum wage  2040  4200 
 - Rate  12.50%  12.50%  Total social security contributions 
employees   - Payment  3187.5  5000 
   20273  30800 
Net take home pay 
   78 €  120 € 
Health care - Lump sum     3900  3900 
 - Rate  36%  36%  Total social security contributions 
employer   - Payment  13080  18300 
   38580  58300 
Labor cost 
   148 €  227 € 
Tax wedge     47%  47% 
   18308  27500  Total fiscal payments 
   70 €  107 € 
Difference YY        9193 
a. Figures are in Hungarian Forints unless otherwise indicated. 
b. Figures in € are calculated using the average exchange rate for the corresponding year. 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ2:	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠ–	 ﾠMain	 ﾠIndicators	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
                 
   1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Real GDP growth  4.9  4.2  5.2  4.1  4.4 
 of which household consumption  4.6  4.8  5  5.7  9.8 
Household saving rate (% GDP)  9.5  7  5.7  5.2  2.7 
CPI  14.3  10  9.8  9.2  5.3 
Gross monthly earnings per full-time employee             
 - HUF  67764  77187  87645  103553  122482 
 - real growth (%)  3.5  5.5  3.4  8.1  12.3 
Net monthly earnings per full-time employee             
 - HUF  45162  50076  55785  64913  77622 
 - real growth (%)  3.6  2.5  1.5  6.4  13.6 
Activity rate (% pop. aged 15-64)  58.7  59.8  60.1  59.6  59.7 
Employment rate (% pop. aged 15-64)  53.7  55.6  56.3  56.2  56.2 
Unemployment rate (% labor force 
15+)  7.8  7  6.4  5.7  5.8 
Youth unemployment rate (% labor 
force 15-24)  15  12.7  12.5  11.3  12.7 
Self-employed (% total employment)  16  15.6  15.1  14.4  13.8 
Part-time employment (% total 
employment)  3.8  3.8  3.5  3.6  3.6 
Fixed term contracts (% total 
employment)  6.5  6.2  7.1  7.5  7.3 
Exchange rate (annual average) 
HUF/EUR  241  253  260  257  243 
a. Sources: MNB (Hungarian National Bank), CSO, European Commission. 	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ3:	 ﾠDescriptive	 ﾠStatistics	 ﾠ
   ALL  SKILLED  UNSKILLED/SEMI-SKILLED 
   Control  Treatment  Control  Treatment  Control  Treatment 
   2000  2001  2000  2001  2000  2001  2000  2001  2000  2001  2000  2001 
N. of HH 
members  3.2  3.2  3.3  3.3  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3 
   (1.1)  (1.1)  (1.3)  (1.3)  (1.1)  (1.1)  (1.1)  (1.1)  (1.2)  (1.2)  (1.5)  (1.5) 
Y0  94084  110955  82109  104282  95001  112475  83888  108635  91270  106707  77671  97115 
   (30487)  (35817)  (32879)  (40362)  (28798)  (34011)  (29993)  (38547)  (29841)  (33689)  (33749)  (40274) 
Y1  101109  117907  89398  112812  102504  120005  91649  117738  98679  114380  85234  105852 
   (31889)  (36891)  (34859)  (42602)  (29904)  (34927)  (32430)  (40425)  (30784)  (35352)  (35602)  (42756) 
Y2  101659  119105  89891  113407  102657  120654  91699  118905  99657  116595  86338  105852 
   (32433)  (38521)  (35390)  (44492)  (30029)  (35533)  (32513)  (44114)  (32105)  (39072)  (36852)  (42756) 
food   23326  28597  21095  25289  23171  29535  21724  25446  22776  27202  20488  24789 
   (10630)  (13067)  (9730)  (11371)  (10219)  (12784)  (8880)  (10913)  (10681)  (12101)  (10757)  (11978) 
C1  86125  102121  79662  97919  86760  105398  84816  102162  80226  93941  72569  89594 
   (33102)  (38612)  (30956)  (37298)  (31433)  (36903)  (31870)  (37862)  (28772)  (31524)  (27268)  (33823) 
C2  88600  105212  81492  100575  88676  108305  86593  105164  82200  96992  74612  91996 
   (34503)  (39489)  (31479)  (38789)  (31849)  (37783)  (32715)  (39744)  (29082)  (32145)  (27587)  (35004) 
N. of HH  593  196  246  100  234  83 
 a. Mean, standard deviation in parenthesis 
 b. Sample: HH with constant family structure and positive income below 200,000 HUF at 2000 prices for the whole period,        
 with at least one member employed for the whole period, s.t. ϖ₂₀₀₀≤w₂₀₀₀≤2*ϖ₂₀₀₁. 
 c. See Appendix for definitions. Y0: regular income,  Y1: regular income + home production,  Y2: Y1+irregular payments. 




   
Dependent var: Δ C2
Treatment -1311** -1596** -1339** -2028*** -2362*** -2172*** -1078
(619) (627) (635) (719) (726) (771) (1799)
ΔHH Income 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.38***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06)




Treatment -849 -579 -482 -55 273 389 2355
(630) (600) (606) (675) (645) (666) (1973)
ΔHH Income 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.29***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06)




Treatment -578 -914 -669 -2331*** -2795*** -2518*** -606.62
(687) (693) (700) (894) (894) (943) (1992)
ΔHH Income 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.44***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09)





Month dummies X X X X X X X
Employee characteristics X X X
Geographical dummies X X X
Demographic characteristics X X X











b. Treatment: N. of HH members employed for the whole period s.t. ϖ₂₀₀₀≤w₂₀₀₀≤ϖ₂₀₀₁ in the private sector.
c. Sample: HH with constant family structure and positive income below 200,000 HUF at 2000 prices for the whole period, 
with at least one member employed for the whole period, s.t. ϖ₂₀₀₀≤w₂₀₀₀≤2*ϖ₂₀₀₁. 
For the mid-income sample, the income limits are 50,000-150,000 HUF at 2000 prices.
d. Δ: change; HH: Household; ϖxx: minimum wage in xx; wxx: wage in xx.
Δ food consumption (excluding own production) 
 
 
   
Dependent var: Δ C2
Treatment -3284*** -3858*** -3437*** -2792** -3382*** -2881**  -6049**
(1104) (1094) (1131) (1252) (1214) (1309) (3069)
ΔHH Income 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.36***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07)




Treatment -345 191 75 750 1525 1450 1447
(898) (903) (900) (1081) (1094) (1080) (2545)
ΔHH Income 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.22***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.07)




Treatment -2711** -3248*** -2903** -4140*** -4663*** -4112*** -3166
(1221) (1196) (1227) (1427) (1401) (1480) (3252)
ΔHH Income 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.31***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10)





Month dummies X X X X X X X
Employee characteristics X X X
Geographical dummies X X X
Demographic characteristics X X X
c. Sample: HH with constant family structure and positive income below 200,000 HUF at 2000 prices for the whole period, 
with at least one member employed for the whole period, s.t. ϖ₂₀₀₀≤w₂₀₀₀≤2*ϖ₂₀₀₁ as skilled worker.
For the mid-income sample, the income limits are 50,000-150,000 HUF at 2000 prices.







Table 5: Skilled  Workers - Baseline
Δ food consumption (excluding own production)
b. Treatment: N. of HH members employed for the whole period s.t. ϖ₂₀₀₀≤w₂₀₀₀≤ϖ₂₀₀₁ in the private sector as skilled workers.
a. OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** [**] (*) denote significance at 1, [5], and (10) percent level.
285
81
2000-2001: Mid-Income Sample 
 
   
Dependent var: Δ C2
Treatment -521.44 -575.06 -460.64 194.61 262.79 396.21 451
(878) (878) (872) (1170) (1195) (1229) (2868)
ΔHH Income 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.39***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11)




Treatment -557 -278 -2 888 1140 1515 2616
(922) (915) (924) (952) (962) (998) (2711)
ΔHH Income 0.06* 0.06* 0.05 0.06 0.48***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.14)




Treatment 530.55 333.9 420.73 1771.92 1607.51 2002.69 -1821
(979) (980) (982) (1471) (1506) (1534) (3270)
ΔHH Income 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.49***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.17)





Month dummies X X X X X X X
Employee characteristics X X X
Geographical dummies X X X
Demographic characteristics X X X
d. Δ: change; HH: Household; ϖxx: minimum wage in xx; wxx: wage in xx.
61
a. OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** [**] (*) denote significance at 1, [5], and (10) percent level.
b. Treatment: N. of HH members employed for the whole period s.t. ϖ₂₀₀₀≤w₂₀₀₀≤ϖ₂₀₀₁ in the private sector as unskilled workers.
c. Sample: HH with constant family structure and positive income below 200,000 HUF at 2000 prices for the whole period, 
with at least one member employed for the whole period, s.t. ϖ₂₀₀₀≤w₂₀₀₀≤2*ϖ₂₀₀₁ as unskilled worker.
For the mid-income sample, the income limits are 50,000-150,000 HUF at 2000 prices.
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Table 6: Unskilled and Semiskilled Workers - Baseline












   
Skilled Unskilled All Skilled Unskilled
-0.03 -0.14*** 0.02 -0.03 -0.15*** 0.02
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
-0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
-0.02 -0.13*** 0.03 -0.02 -0.14** 0.02
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
-0.14** -0.28*** -0.06 -1772** -3960*** -823.24
(0.06) (0.10) (0.09) (763) (1229) (1017)
0.02 0.08 0.00 -749 311 -658
(0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (684) (1031) (1006)
-0.06 -0.22** 0.04 -996 -3292** 17.71
(0.07) (0.11) (0.12) (857) (1341) (1114)
Table 7: Treatment Effect - Alternative Specifications
f. Δ: change; HH: Household; ϖxx: minimum wage in xx; wxx: wage in xx.
b. OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
c. *** [**] (*) denote significance at 1, [5], and (10) percent level.
d. Baseline Treatment (Dummy Treatment): N. of ( =1 if there are) HH members employed for the whole 
All





a. Dependent variable is change in (log) food consumption (excluding own production); monthly. All regressions 
Dummy Treatment




Sample size (Treated HH) 1999-2000: All - 838 (196), Skilled: 375 (88), Unskilled: 312 (82). 
Sample size (Treated HH) Mid-Income: All - 625 (148), Skilled: 285 (81), Unskilled: 259 (61). 
period s.t. ϖ₂₀₀₀≤w₂₀₀₀≤ϖ₂₀₀₁ in the private sector. Continuous Treatment: ∑ (w₂₀₀₀-ϖ₂₀₀₀) within HH. 
include Month dummies and change in HH income as additional controls. 
Sample size (Treated HH) 2000-2001: All - 789 (196), Skilled: 346 (100), Unskilled: 317 (83). 
e. Sample: HH with constant family structure and positive income below 200,000 HUF at 2000 prices 
for the whole period, with at least one member employed for the whole period (as skilled/unskilled worker),
s.t. ϖ₂₀₀₀≤w₂₀₀₀≤2*ϖ₂₀₀₁. For the mid-income sample, the income limits are 50,000-150,000 HUF at 2000 prices.   
All Skilled Unskilled All Skilled Unskilled
Time controls -4352* -10879*** -693 -2374 -6555* -775
(2387) (3637) (4220) (2602) (3607) (5439)
Full controls -4299 -9300** 3872 -3848 -8733** 9772
(2706) (4171) (4626) (2937) (4322) (6289)
Time controls -3425 -11102*** 267 -985 -6569* 106
(2821) (4035) (4792) (2901) (3954) (5756)
Full controls -2751 -9914** 5040 -1643 -9119** 11138
(3125) (4607) (5385) (3151) (4520) (7070)
Time controls -0.43* -0.79** -0.47 -0.19 -0.42 -0.36
(0.24) (0.37) (0.39) (0.27) (0.34) (0.58)
Full controls -0.41 -0.69* -0.25 -0.33 -0.54 0.29
(0.26) (0.40) (0.44) (0.29) (0.43) (0.64)
Time controls -0.050** -0.115*** -0.028 -0.03 -0.078** -0.023
(0.023) (0.033) (0.039) (0.024) (0.034) (0.046)
Full controls -0.060** -0.102*** 0.004 -0.049* -0.100** 0.058
(0.026) (0.035) (0.047) (0.028) (0.040) (0.054)
Time controls -0.048* -0.122*** -0.03 -0.021 -0.083** -0.022
(0.028) (0.037) (0.046) (0.028) (0.038) (0.050)
Full controls -0.052* -0.111*** 0.001 -0.032 -0.106** 0.06
(0.031) (0.039) (0.055) (0.030) (0.043) (0.061)
Observations 789 346 317 625 285 259
Treated HH 196 100 83 148 81 61
Table 8 : Consumption-Income Gap
c. *** [**] (*) denote significance at 1, [5], and (10) percent level.
g. Δ: change; HH: Household; ϖXX: minimum wage in xx; wxx: wage in xx.
s.t. ϖ₂₀₀₀≤w₂₀₀₀≤2*ϖ₂₀₀₁. For the mid-income sample, the income limits are 50,000-150,000 HUF at 2000 prices.
 dummies, Demographic characteristics. See Appendix for details.
f. Sample: HH with constant family structure and positive income below 200,000 HUF at 2000 prices 
for the whole period, with at least one member employed for the whole period (as skilled/unskilled worker),
d. Baseline Treatment (Dummy Treatment): N. of ( =1 if there are) HH members employed for the whole period
 (as skilled/unskilled worker), s.t. ϖ₂₀₀₀≤w₂₀₀₀≤ϖ₂₀₀₁ in the private sector. Continuous Treatment: ∑ (w₂₀₀₀-ϖ₂₀₀₀) within HH  








Whole Sample Mid-Income Sample
a. C2: consumption of nondurable goods+transfers, 
Y2: regular income + home production+irregular payments. See Appendix for details.
b. OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
C1-Y1 C1-Y2 C2-Y1 lnC1-lnY1 lnC1-lnY2 lnC2-lnY1
Time controls -4855** -4375* -4833** -0.051** -0.047** -0.054**
(2163) (2351) (2205) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
Full controls -4816** -3927 -5189** -0.062** -0.055** -0.067***
(2414) (2660) (2474) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026)
Observations
Treated HH
Time controls -10404*** -10826*** -10457*** -0.114*** -0.114*** -0.114***
(3450) (3635) (3471) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Full controls -8593** -9625** -8267** -0.101*** -0.105*** -0.098***
(3824) (4167) (3853) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034)
Observations
Treated HH
Time controls -2424 -93 -3025 -0.035 -0.02 -0.043
(3587) (4234) (3544) (0.039) (0.041) (0.037)
Full controls 791 3863 801 -0.011 0.008 -0.015
(4215) (4569) (4261) (0.050) (0.049) (0.048)
Observations
Treated HH
Table 9 : Consumption-Income Gap - Baseline Treatment - Alternative Measures
 period, with at least one member employed for the whole period (as skilled/unskilled worker), s.t. ϖ₂₀₀₀≤w₂₀₀₀≤2*ϖ₂₀₀₁.
g. Δ: change; HH: Household; ϖXX: minimum wage in xx; wxx: wage in xx.
 dummies, Demographic characteristics. See Appendix for details.
d. Baseline Treatment (Dummy Treatment): N. of ( =1 if there are) HH members employed for the whole period
(as skilled/unskilled worker), s.t. ϖ₂₀₀₀≤w₂₀₀₀≤ϖ₂₀₀₁ in the private sector. Continuous Treatment: ∑ (w₂₀₀₀-ϖ₂₀₀₀) within HH. 





f. Sample: HH with constant family structure and positive income below 200,000 HUF at 2000 prices for the whole
Y2: Y1+irregular payments. See Appendix for details.
b. OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.






a. C1: consumption of nondurable goods, C2: C1+transfers, Y1: regular income + home production, 